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Park: Torts: Liability for Negligently Induced Emotional Disturbance
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

TORTS: LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENTLY INDUCED
EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE
Colla v. Mendella, 1 Wis.2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957)
Defendant negligently permitted his truck to crash into decedent's home adjacent to the room in which he was sleeping. Decedent,
who had a history of heart trouble, awoke, suffered severe fright,
and died ten days later. Decedent's wife sued to recover for his
death. The trial court denied defendent's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, HELD, impact is not necessary to a cause of action
for physical injury resulting from fright alone. Order affirmed.
In few areas of human activity does the language of the past
haunt the wisdom of the present so effectively as in law.' In a time
of medical and psychological sophistication in mind-body relationships, a large minority of American courts, including Florida,2 still
refuse recovery for physical injuries resulting from negligently induced fear or emotional disturbance unless accompanied by physical
impact.3 In the absence of physical injury, American courts still refuse to allow any recovery for negligence resulting in emotional dis4
turbance.
A majority of jurisdictions, reasoning as in the instant case, permit recovery for physical injuries when the provoking emotional
disturbance sprang from plaintiff's fear of personal injury. s But, if
in the instant case the emotional disturbance of plaintiff's husband
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 148-159 (1930).
Crane v. Loftin, 70 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1954); Clark v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Corp.,
10 Fla. Supp. 174 (Cir. Ct. 1957).
3E.g., Kentucky Traction & T. Co. v. Roman, 232 Ky. 285, 23 S.W.2d 272 (1929);
Weissman v. Wells, 306 Mo. 82, 267 S.W. 400 (1924); O'Brien v. Moss, 222 App.
Div. 464, 221 N.Y. Supp. 621 (4th Dep't 1927).
4The Black Gull, 82 F.2d 758 (2d Cir. 1936); Davis v. Cleveland Ry., 135 Ohio
St. 401, 21 N.E.2d 169 (1939); Wedgworth v. Fort Worth. 189 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1945); PROssER, TORTS §37, n.24 (2d 3ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §§313,
436 (2) (1934). But see Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So.2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1950), holding
that recovery will be granted for mental disturbance even in the absence of physical
injury "where the wrongful act is such as to reasonably imply malice, or where,
from the entire want of care of attention to duty, or great indifference to the
persons, property, or rights of others, such malice will be imputed as would justify
the assessment of exemplary or punitive damages."
5E.g., Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892); Kenny v.
Wong Len, 81 N.H. 427, 128 At. 343 (1925); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Hayter, 93 Tex.
239, 54 S.W. 944 (1900).
'FRANK,
2
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had sprung exclusively from fear for her safety, only a minority of
jurisdictions would have permitted recovery.6 Despite the obvious
significance to the victim of threats to his kin and the persuasiveness
of pleas by eminent legal theorists for allowing recovery in these
situations,7 a majority of American courts refuse." Further, should
a court decide that the emotional disturbance of a decedent was caused
exclusively by fear for his property, the court would almost certainly
deny recovery.9
Historically, the courts, emerging from a relatively poor, landcentered world into a lush overgrowth of solvency and new standards
of social responsibility, were at first inclined toward the impact requirement.'0 By approximately 1916, however, the trend had been
reversed." In the search for arguments that would permit relief, the
first break-throughs came with the discovery of special duties owed to
patrons by public carriers and innkeepers, 12 with the recognition of
mere token impact,'3 with a willingness to forego impact in the face
of wanton and willful negligence or intentional emotional disturbance, 24 and with a willingness to trace injuries to such established
torts as trespass.'9
6E.g., Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912); Bowman v.
Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 At. 182 (1933); Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. v. Coopwood, 96
S.W. 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906).
7Dulieu v. White g- Sons, 2 K.B. 669, THE LAw TiM S 129 (1901), refers to
criticism by Mr. Sedgwick, Sr. Frederick Pollock, and Mr. Bevan of failure to recognize the significance of threat to others. See also PROSSER, TORTS §37, n.40-45
(2d ed. 1955).
8E.g., Nuckles v. Tennessee Elec. Power Co., 155 Tenn. 611, 299 S.W. 775 (1927);
Carey v. Pure Distributing Corp., 139 Tex. 31, 124 S.W.2d 847 (1939); Waube v.
Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
DAronoff v. Baltimore Transit Co., 197 Md. 528, 80 A.2d 13 (1951); Furlan v.
Rayan Photo Works, Inc., 171 Misc. 839, 12 N.Y.S.2d 921 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1939);
see collection of cases, 28 A.L.R.2d 1070 (1953).
'oLehman v. Brooklyn City R.R., 47 Hun 355 (N.Y. 1888); Victorian Rys.
Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888).
"See Throckmorton, Damages for Fright,84 HARv. L. RiEv. 260 (1921).
"2Louisville & N.R.R. v. Robinson, 213 Ala. 522, 105 So. 874 (1925) (servants of
public carriers); Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932)
(collector); Milner Hotels, Inc. v. Daugherty, 195 Miss. 718, 15 So.2d 358 (1943)
(innkeeper); LaSalle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.Y. 424
(1934) (collector).
"See notes 21, 22, 23, 24 infra.
'4Crane v. Loftin, 70 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1954); Kirksey v. Jemigan, 45 So.2d 188
(Fla. 1950); Atlanta Hub Co. v. Jones, 47 Ga. App. 778, 171 S.E. 470 (1933).
25Yoakum v. Kroeger, 27 S.W. 953 (Tex. 1894); Chicago & N.W. Ry, v. Hunner-
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Medical authorities no longer doubt that a mental shock may
result in serious physical injury under relatively common circumstances.18 Why, then, do some jurisdictions persist in requiring impact? Is it a hearty contempt for those so weak-willed as to let themselves be injured by what they "see"? Is it perhaps a fear that the
injury is merely "mental"'17 or, even worse, that the injury is faked?' 8
Since the courts that permit recovery do so only when it is determined that there is actual, consequential physical injury,19 as evidenced by modern medical diagnostic techniques and determined as
a matter of fact by the jury, to persist in requiring impact appears to
be a foolish formalization of relief requirements similar to that
undergone by the common law forms of action in the sixteenth century. 20 After all, the impact rule itself has permitted a strained casuis-

berg, 16 Ill. App. 387 (1885).
6White, Trauma, Stress and the "Arteriosclerotic" Heart (Coronary Heart
Disease), in MaD. TRIAL Tren. Q. 1956 Annual 135 (1956); Wolff, Life Stress and
Bodily Disease in 1 WEIDER, CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY 315
(1953).
"7E.g., Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899); Johnson v. Wells,
Fargo & Co., 6 Nev. 542 (1870); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E.
354 (1896).
1SAs an example of mossbackism at its fuzzy best, note this quote from Huston
v. Freemansburg Boro., 212 Pa. 548, 61 Atl. 1022 (1905): "The industry of counsel
in the present case has furnished us with a few other cases favorable to his contention. But they do not show any sound reason for a change of our view. All
of the cases are of recent and unhealthy growth, and none of them stands squarely
on the ancient ways. In the last half century the ingenuity of counsel, stimulated
by the cupidity of clients and encouraged by the prejudices of juries, has expanded
the action for negligence until it overtops all others in frequency and importance,
but it is only in the very end of that period that it has been stretched to the effort
to cover so intangible, so untrustworthy, so illusory and so speculative a cause of
action as mere mental disturbance. It requires but a brief judicial experience to be
convinced of the large proportion of exaggeration and even of fraud in the ordinary action for physical injuries from negligence, and if we opened the door to
this new invention the result would be great danger, if not disaster to the cause
of practical justice ...."
Although Huston v. Freemansburg Borough is still the law in Pennsylvania,
criticism finally appeared in 1957 when Erwin, J., in Bosley v. Andrews, 184 Pa.
Super. 396, 135 A.2d 690, suggested in a dissenting opinion that the rule resulted
in questionable justice. The liberal Pennsylvania courts have cited the Huston
case 15 times and the case from which the rule was derived, Ewing v. Pittsburgh C.
& St. L. Ry., 147 Pa. 40, 23 Atl. 340 (1892), 20 times without criticism.
19 See note 4 supra.
2OZANE, THE STORY OF LAw 289 (1927): "Sometime between 1500 and 1560
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try in application. The courts have recognized dust in the eye,!
smoke in the lungs,

22

numerous jars and slight falls, 23 and a horse's

evacuation of its bowels into plaintiff's lap24 as impact sufficient to impose liability. This is simply evidence of the courts' laboring toward
justice in the chains of an outmoded legal technicality.
So the movement, from nineteenth-century indifference to mental
suffering and suspicious refusal to allow recovery for damages resulting from mental pain and anguish 25 toward a more sophisticated
recognition of causal relationships between the body as receptor of
stimuli and the body as an effective organ of neutral responses to
these stimuli, has been slow and hampered by the law's primitive,
dualistic view of the body and its "mind." Persuasive and perceptive
authorities have long argued for recognition of mental suffering ind
its effects, 26 but legal progress is a deliberate beast. To the extent of

economic feasibility and to the extent that the costs of liability can
be effectively distributed or hidden, gradual progress will probably
continue to be made toward protecting the innocent victims of negligent acts.
ROBERT

E. PARK.

came in another great change in the face of the law. The old system of oral
pleading before the court was changed to the present system of putting in written
pleading. ... The change was exceedingly unfortunate. The system was of iron.
A variance between the declaration and the proof was fatal."
2
'Porter v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 AtI. 860 (Sup. Ct. 1906)
(dust in the eye in combination with a light, unidentified blow on the neck as
impact).
22Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930).
23E.g., Block v. Pascucci, 111 Conn. 58, 149 At. 210 (1930) (plaintiff fell to
ground after fainting); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Roberts, 207 Ky. 310, 269 S.W. 333
(1925) (plaintiff, living in railroad box car, jarred and shaken when owners attempted to eject her by ripping her porch off the car and jacking the car up);
Southern Ry. in Kentucky v. Owen, 156 Ky. 827, 162 S.W. 110 (1914) (boy carried
along by water from burst water tank jarred and shaken up).
24Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 111 S.E. 680 (1928).
25
See note 10 supra.
26Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance As Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REv. 497
(1922); Green, "Fright" Cases, 27 ILL. L. Rav. 761 (1931); Green, Proximate Cause,
17 TExAs B.J. 161 (1954); Hallen, Damages for Physical Injuries Resulting from
Fright or Shock, 19 VA. L. REv. 253 (1933); Hallen, Hill v. Kimball-A Milepost
in the Law, 12 TExAs L. Rav. 1 (1933); Havard, Reasonable Foresight of Nervous
Shock, 19 MODEaN L. REv. 478 (1956); Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34
HARv. L. REv. 260 (1921).
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